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Abstract
Using cultural transmission, we develop a model that gives some microfoundation
to the impact of residential neighborhood on children’s educational attainment and
then test it using the UK National Child Development Study. We ﬁnd that, for high-
educated parents, the better the quality of the neighborhood in terms of human capital,
the higher the parent’s involvement in children’s education, indicating cultural comple-
mentarity. For high-educated parents, we also ﬁnd that both parents’ involvement in
education and neighborhood’s quality signiﬁcantly aﬀect the intergenerational trans-
mission of education, the former being more potent than the latter. Low-educated
parents do not spend much time educating their oﬀspring and we show that only the
quality of the neighborhood has a signiﬁcant impact on their children’s educational
attainment.
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11 Introduction
The investigation of neighborhood eﬀects on individual’s educational attainment has re-
cently received considerable attention (see for example the remarkable survey of Durlauf,
2004). Many studies have focused on the measurement of neighborhood eﬀects on individ-
ual’s educational attainment using various econometric techniques. The general consensus is
that the neighborhood where individuals grow up matters, although the eﬀects are not large
after controlling for individual and family characteristics and parental selection of residential
neighborhood.
The open question is the mechanism underlying these eﬀects. As pointed out by Durlauf
(2004) “...the evidence of neighborhood eﬀects in this literature is largely a black box, i.e. it
is diﬃcult to translate the ﬁndings of the papers into speciﬁc microeconomic mechanism.”
The focus of this paper is on the role of neighborhood quality in the intergenerational
transmission of education and our aim is to provide a simple microeconomic mechanism that
explains the link between the educational attainment of children and the average educational
level of their residential neighborhood community. This link is established through parents’
involvement in their children’s education. Indeed, in our framework, neighborhood quality
inﬂuences parents’ involvement in education and this, in turn, aﬀects children’ education
attainment.
The literature on children’s education is large and most studies have found that school
quality (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1992, 1996, and Hanushek, 2002), family background (e.g.,
Ermisch and Francesconi, 2001, Sacerdote, 2002, Plug and Vijverberg, 2003) and neighbor-
hood quality (e.g., Durlauf, 2004) have a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the level of
education of children.1 As stated above, we provide here a new mechanism that highlights
the role of parents’ involvement in education.2 Based on some works on anthropology and
sociology (see in particular Boyd and Richerson, 1985, Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981),
there is a recent literature initiated by Bisin and Verdier,3 arguing that the transmission of a
1See also the literature survey by Haveman and Wolfe (1995) who compare the sociological and economic
approaches.
2There are in fact theoretical papers that analyze either the eﬀects of parents’ input (see e.g. Becker and
Tomes, 1979, Leibowitz, 1974) or neighborhood’s quality (see e.g. De Bartolome, 1990, Benabou, 1993) on
children’s educational attainement. Our model links these two approaches and, as a result, gives a mechanism
through which both eﬀects aﬀect children’s outcomes.
3Indeed, Bisin and Verdier were the ﬁrst to introduce cultural transmission in an economic framework.
They use this concept to explain the transmission of social status (Bisin and Verdier, 1998), ethnicity and
religion (Bisin and Verdier, 2000a), political power (Bisin and Verdier, 2000b) and cultural traits (Bisin and
Verdier, 2001). More recently, Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) and Saez-Marti and Zenou (2004) have used
2particular trait (religion, ethnicity, social status, etc) is the outcome of a socialization inside
and outside the family (like e.g peers and role models). These two types of socialization
are cultural substitutes (complements) if parents have less (more) incentive to socialize their
children the more widely dominant are their values in the population.
We use this idea to explain children’s educational attainment. To be more precise, we
propose a simple theoretical model in which altruistic parents, who can either be educated or
not, have to decide how much time they spend educating their children. This is costly since
parents have to give up leisure but also rewarding since it positively inﬂuences the chance for
their children to be educated. Contrary to the cultural transmission literature cited above
where each parent wants his/her children to be like him/her, here only educated parents
have this behavior while uneducated parents spend time with their children trying to help
them becoming diﬀerent, that is educated. This is because education is not, like for example
religion or ethnicity, a trait that is horizontally diﬀerentiated (so that it is a matter of taste
that one trait is considered better than another) but a trait, or more exactly a characteristic,
that it is vertically diﬀerentiated (so that everybody agrees that more education is better
than less). As in the cultural transmission model, children can become educated either
because parents have been successful in educating them (socialization inside the family) or,
if this is not the case, because the neighborhood where they live is of suﬃciently high-quality
in terms of human capital (socialization outside the family). We assume that uneducated
parents are less eﬃcient in educating their children than educated parents because either
they are less able or do not prioritize education. In this respect, there are two aspects of
education: the time spent with children and the quality or intensity of this time. Given the
quality of the neighborhood, the crucial decision for each parent is how much time to spend
educating their children.
First, we show that educated parents spend more time (or more eﬀort) educating their
children that uneducated parents simply because the rewards are higher. If the utility func-
tion is such that the higher the eﬀort, the higher the marginal utility of leisure, cultural
substitution prevails while if the loss in the marginal utility of leisure following an increase
in eﬀort is low, there is cultural complementarity. Second, we demonstrate that, with cul-
tural complementarity, better-quality neighborhood increases the probability to be educated
and decreases the probability to be uneducated while this is undetermined with cultural
substitution. Finally, if uneducated parents are very ineﬃcient in educating their children
(because for example they do not prioritize at all education), then we show that only the
neighborhood quality aﬀects the educational attainment of their children.
cultural substitution to explain the transmission of corruption and work ethic, respectively.
3We ﬁnd evidence in line with these predictions by merging data on parents and children
from the UK National Child Development Study (NCDS) with data on neighborhood char-
acteristics from the 1971 UK Census (when children are 13 years old). First, adopting a
number of explanatory variables to address possible unobserved variables and controlling for
endogeneity issues, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of neighborhood quality on highly
educated parents’ interest in their children’s education, suggesting cultural complementar-
ity.4 For low-educated parents, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect, suggesting that their eﬀort is
not very high (as it is documented by comparing the eﬀort levels of educated and unedu-
cated parents). Second, for high-educated parents, we ﬁnd that both parents’ involvement in
education and neighborhood’s quality signiﬁcantly aﬀect the intergenerational transmission
of education, the former being more potent than the latter. On the other hand, we ﬁnd
that low-educated parents do not spend much time educating their oﬀsprings and only the
quality of the neighborhood has a signiﬁcant impact on children’s educational attainment.
These empirical evidence for the UK corroborate the results obtained for the US. As
stated above, the latter indicate a limited role for neighborhood factors in accounting for
inequality in educational attainment (Solon, Page and Duncan, 2000, Durlauf, 2004), which
m a yb ei n t e r p r e t e da st h ef a c tt h a tf a m i l ym a t t e r sm o r et h a nn e i g h b o r h o o d .I nt h ep r e s e n t
paper, we go further by diﬀerentiating between high- and low-skill workers. Family seems
to play a crucial role only for children of high-educated parents while it is the neighborhood
that appears to be the main determinant of children’s education attainment for low-skilled
workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents some
descriptive evidence on the relationship between education and the quality of the neighbor-
hood. In section 3, the theoretical model and its main predictions are exposed. Section 4
deals with the empirical model and estimation issues while section 5 is devoted to the data
and the deﬁnition of the variables. Section 6 gives the main empirical results and discusses
endogeneity issues. Finally, section 7 concludes.
4To the best of our knowledge, few papers have tested whether cultural substitution or cultural comple-
mentarity prevails. A rare exception is Bisin et al. (2004) for the transmission of religion and, contrary
to this paper, they ﬁnd cultural substitution. This is quite intuitive since they are dealing with religion
so that the more a religion is in minority in a state the more parents put eﬀort in transmitting it. For
education, we ﬁnd the contrary and this could be interpreted considering that education and the quality of
the neighborhood may be quite naturally complement.
42 Descriptive evidence
In this section, using our entire data set,5 we provide some simple evidence on the link
between children’s education attainment and the quality of neighborhood where they live in
the UK.
First, looking at the distribution of UK Census wards by average human capital of the
residential community (i.e., the proportion of high-skilled workers per ward), we ﬁnd that
most neighborhood residential communities are highly homogeneous with respect to their
educational attainment. In Figure 1 we consider the percentage of high-skilled (that is the
percentage of persons over 18 years old holding a A-level6 or higher qualiﬁcation) in a ward
(neighborhood) and the percentage of wards having a certain level of average human capital.
It can be seen that roughly 50 percent and nearly 30 percent of wards have respectively less
than 25 percent and more than 85 percent of high-skilled workers. This means that almost
80 percent of these areas are very homogenous along the education dimension (since they
have either less than 25 percent or more than 85 percent of high-skilled workers).










proportion of high skilled population
Second, Figure 2 displays the relationship between the average neighborhood human
capital quality and the average frequency that a child, having parents of type i = h,l (h
5See Section 5 for a detailed description of our data.
6The A-level in UK is equivalent to the SAT in the US or the baccalaureat in France.
5and l stand respectively for high and low education level),7 is of type j = h,l.T ob em o r e











where Nk denotes the number of observations (children) in each area k, sij
n is a dummy
variable that is equal to one if a child n (n =1 ,...,Nk), of type j = h,l, who resides in
ward k (k =1 ,...,K), has a parent of type i = h,l, and is equal to zero otherwise. These
empirical frequencies are then averaged over the areas with a similar proportion of high











where Kr is the number of wards having an observed percentage interval r (r =1 0 ,...,70)
of high-skilled residents and p
ij
kr is the empirical probability for each area k in the diﬀerent
groups.
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∗plh is rescaled by 100
7We consider parents as educated if either the father or the mother is educated (having A-level qualiﬁcation
or above), and not educated otherwise.
6For example, for r =2 0 , p
ij
20 is the observed average frequency of children of type j whose
parents are of type i and who reside in neighborhoods with a percentage of high-skilled people
between 10 and 20 percent. The values pij (i.e. the pij
r for diﬀerent values of r) are reported
in Figure 2, where a line has been drawn between the diﬀerent points in each panel. It is
striking to observe the inﬂuence of the neighborhood on the chance to be educated. Indeed,
both phh and plh are increasing functions of the residential neighborhood quality whereas
both pll and phl are decreasing functions of the same variable. This documents a positive
assortative matching of these frequencies along the neighborhood human capital quality,
which means that, irrespective of parental education, better quality neighborhoods yield
higher chance to be educated. If we investigate further, it is also easy to see that parents’
education does play a role. Take for example r =1 0 , i.e. very low quality neighborhoods (less
than 10 percent high-skill workers). If one compares children whose parents have diﬀerent
backgrounds, then, irrespective of the neighborhood, the chance to be uneducated is much
higher for those with low-educated parents (pll
10 ≈ 80%) than with high-educated parents
(phl
10 ≈ 10%). At the opposite, in a good quality neighborhood (60-70 percent are skilled),
the chance to be uneducated for a child whose parents are educated (phl
70) is zero while for a
c h i l dw h o s ep a r e n ti sn o te d u c a t e d( pll
70) it is roughly 10 percent.
Even though this evidence can be driven by an endogenous sorting of families into residen-
tial locations,8 it suggests the possibility that both the family background and the quality of
the neighborhood may aﬀect the educational attainment of children growing up in the area.
In order to better understand these results, we propose a simple theoretical model in the
next section where the relationship between parents’ involvement in education, the quality
of the neighborhood and children’s educational attainment is explicitly analyzed.
3T h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
In this section, we analyze the intergenerational transmission of education. The key question
we would like to study is how much parents are inﬂuenced by the local environment when
they want to decide how much eﬀort they put in educating their children. As in Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2001), the transmission of education is modeled as a mechanism that interacts
socialization inside the family (vertical socialization) with socialization outside the family
(oblique socialization) via imitation and learning from peers and role models.9
8We discuss in details this issue in Section 6.3.
9Observe that the model provided here is quite diﬀerent to that of Bisin and Verdier. Here, contrary
to Bisin and Verdier, parents do not transmit a “trait” but decide how much eﬀort they spend with their
7There are two types of parents/workers: high-educated, i = h, and low-educated parents,
i = l. There is a continuum of each of them. The instantaneous utility of a parent of type





where zi is the quantity of a consumption good (taken as the numeraire) consumed by the
parents, λ
i is the time spent on leisure and ei is time (eﬀort) they spend with their children
trying to educate them. U(.) is assumed to be increasing in λ
i and decreasing in the eﬀort
ei, and concave in both arguments. This choice of the utility function aims at capturing
the fact that the time spent with children and on leisure are not independent activities for
parents.




where wi is the per-hour wage (with wh >w l)a n dT denotes the amount of working hours.
T is assumed to be the same and constant across workers, an assumption that agrees with
most jobs in the vast majority of developed countries.11
Each worker provides a ﬁxed amount of labor time T and spends some time for leisure
and for children. Thus, the time constraint of a worker i = h,l can be written as:
1 − T = λ
i + e
i (2)
in which the total amount of time is normalized to 1 without loss of generality.
By plugging (1) and (2) into the utility function, we obtain the following instantaneous













L e tu sn o wf o c u so nt h ep a r e n t ’ sc h o i c eo fe ﬀort ei ∈ [0,1]. Because low-educated parents
have less “knowledge” than high-educated parents, we assume that they are less successful
in educating their children. In other words, if both high- and low-educated parents put eﬀort
e in educating their oﬀsprings, the probability that their kids will be educated is e and δe
(with 0 <δ<1) for high- and low-educated parents respectively. Thus, for the educated
children. The fundamental diﬀerence is that, since education is not a “trait”, and because of altruism, low-
educated parents do not want their children to be like them and thus put eﬀort to educate their children.
10None of our results is aﬀected by the fact that the utility function is separable.
11We could have assumed that more educated individuals work more hours than less educated workers.
This would not aﬀect any of our results.
8parent, with a probability equal to the education eﬀort eh, education will be successful and
the child will be like the parent (highly educated). For the uneducated parents, education
will be successful with probability δel (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 captures the relative ineﬃciency in the
education process for the uneducated parents). In a more general interpretation, δ could
capture the fact that low-educated parents are less “intense” in educating their kids because
they have diﬀerent priorities than educated parents. In this interpretation, δ =1means
that education is a top priority for the parents so the time they spend with their kids is of
very high quality while a δ close to zero implies that parents are not prioritizing education
and the interaction with their kids while educating them is not of high quality (for example,
they talk to their kids about education while watching television). In this respect, there are
two aspects of education: ei, the time spent with children and δ
i (δ
h =1and δ
l = δ), the
quality or intensity of this time.
In both cases, if education is not successful, the child remains without education and
gets randomly matched with somebody else whose education he/she will adopt. It is at this
second stage, after the parents’ unsuccessful education, that children are inﬂuenced by their
peers or teachers (role models).
We denote by πij the probability that a child of type-i parent (i ∈ {h,l}) obtains edu-
cation j ∈ {h,l}. Since there is a continuum of agents, by the Law of Large Numbers, πij
also denotes the fraction of children with a parent i who has education j.D e n o t i n g b y q




h +( 1− e
h)q (4)
π
hl =( 1− e
h)(1 − q) (5)
π
ll =( 1− δe
l)(1 − q) (6)
π
lh = δe
l +( 1− δe
l)q (7)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Let us interpret equation (4). The child of a high-educated parent will
also be highly educated if either his/her parent’s education is successful (probability eh)o r
if the parent fails to transmit his/her trait (probability 1 − eh) and the child picks up the
education trait from the society (probability q). Equation (5) gives the probability that a
child of educated parents is not educated: it is because both the parents and the society
were not successful in educating the child. For the non-educated parents (equations (6) and
(7)), we have a similar interpretation, with the diﬀerence that parents are less eﬃcient in
educating their kids.
9We are now able to write the expected utility function of all parents. We assume that all
parents (educated or not) are altruist and thus do care of the future job situation of their
children. We denote by V ij, i = h,l, j = h,l, the future utility of a child j whose parent
is of type i. Note that this utility is evaluated by the parents and thus take their point of
view. The simplest interpretation of these utilities is in terms of the child’s future income,
given that wh >w l. In other words, all parents (educated or not) will be better oﬀ if their
children achieve high education and thus make more money. For simplicity and without loss































































h +( 1− q)w
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where 0 <a<1 is the degree of altruism that is common to both educated and uneducated
parents. Let us now determine ei, the eﬀo r t ’ sc h o i c eo fp a r e n t si = h,l.I f w e u s e t h e
following notations Uλi ≡ ∂U
∂λi and Uei ≡ ∂U
∂ei,t h e nt h eﬁrst order conditions for the educated
and the uneducated parents are respectively given by (we only focus on interior solutions):13
−Uλi + Uei + aδ








l = δ. The solution of (8) is denoted by ei∗,w h i c hi se q u a lt oeh∗(q) and
el∗(q,δ) for high- and low-educated parents respectively. If we further adopt the following
notations, Uλiλi ≡ ∂2U
∂λi∂λi and Uλiei ≡ ∂2U
∂λi∂ei, we have the following proposition:
12The altruistic model was made famous by Becker (1974, 1991). For a recent survey on these types of
models, see Laferrere and Wolﬀ (2004).
13For each parent i = h,l, the second order condition is given by:
Uλiλi + Ueiei − 2Uλiei
and is assumed to be negative.
10Proposition 1
(i) High-educated parents spend more time in educating their oﬀspring than low-educated
parents, and this diﬀerence increases with δ, the relative ineﬃciency of success for
low-educated parents.
(ii) Assume either Uλe > 0 or Uλλ <U λe < 0. Then, for both educated and uneducated
parents, the higher the proportion of high-educated people in the area, the lower the









This is referred to as cultural substitution.
(iii) Assume Uλe <U λλ < 0. Then, for both educated and uneducated parents, the higher
the proportion of high-educated people in the area, the higher the eﬀort parents put in









This is referred to as cultural complementarity.
The ﬁrst order condition (8) shows that the choice of e∗ involves a trade oﬀ between
the short-run costs of spending time with children (the resulting forgone leisure) and the
long-run expected beneﬁts, which consist in a better chance of having an educated child
with a higher wage. When Uλe > 0,w h i c hm e a n st h a tt h eh i g h e rt h ee ﬀort e,t h eh i g h e rt h e
marginal utility of leisure, the costs are higher and the parents put less eﬀort the higher the
level of education in the economy (cultural substitution). On the contrary when Uλe < 0 and
Uλe <U λλ, which means that the loss in the marginal utility of leisure following an increase in
e is low, the parents put more eﬀort the higher the level of education in the economy (cultural
complementarity). Observe that Proposition 1 implies that for low educated parents, if δ ≈ 0
the quality of the neighborhood should not aﬀect parental eﬀort in educating the children
(∂ei∗
∂q ≈ 0). This results is emphasized in Proposition 3.
Figure 3 helps us to understand result (i) in Proposition 1. Because it is costly to spend
time with children, the higher the returns, the higher parents’ eﬀort ei. So, because the
returns to the investment ei is lower for the low-educated parents, they spend less time
educating their kids. As discussed above, this may be because low-educated parents have
11diﬀerent priorities and thus may not prioritize education as high-educated parents do. Also,
the lower δ, the return to low-educated parents’ investment, the higher the diﬀerence between
eh and el.
Figure 3: Eﬀort diﬀerences between educated and uneducated parents
0 1
i i e U U − λ
l h e e , * l e * h e
() ()
l h w w q a − − 1 δ
() ()
l h w w q a − − 1
We can now calculate the expected school achievement of each individual by focusing on
the diﬀerent transition probabilities.
Proposition 2


















(ii) For low-educated parents, the probabilities that their child will be educated and non-
















12(iii) For both parents (educated or not), if there is cultural complementarity, better-quality
neighborhood increases the probability to be educated and decreases the probability to be
uneducated, that is ∂πhh
∂q > 0, ∂πlh
∂q > 0 and ∂πhl
∂q < 0, ∂πll
∂q < 0. If there is cultural sub-
stitution, all these eﬀects are undetermined. Finally, for a given neighborhood quality
q,p a r e n t s ’e ﬀort always increases the chance for their oﬀspring to be educated, that is
∂πhh
∂eh > 0, ∂πlh
∂el > 0 and ∂πhl
∂eh < 0, ∂πll
∂el < 0.
Results (i) and (ii) just express the transition probabilities (4)-(7) in terms of optimal
parents’ eﬀort. The interesting result is (iii) s i n c ei ts h o w st h ei m p a c to fb o t ht h eq u a l i t y
of the neighborhood and parents’ involvement on children’s education attainment. Since
t h ee d u c a t i o np r o c e s si si nt w os t a g e s( ﬁrst the parents’ involvement ei and then the neigh-
borhood’s quality q) and since both stages are inﬂuenced by q,t h e r ea r et w oe ﬀects: an
indirect one, in which ei hinges on q,a n dadirect one because, if ei fails, then only q aﬀects
children’s educational attainment. So, when there is cultural complementarity, these two
eﬀects reinforce each other since a higher q implies a higher indirect (the higher the quality
of the neighborhood, the higher parents’ eﬀort) and direct eﬀects. If, on the contrary, there is
cultural substitution, then a better quality neighborhood reduces the chance to be educated
by parents (since parents spend less time with their kids) but increases the chance to be
educated by peers (since q is higher the chance to meet a high-educated peer is higher). The
net eﬀect is thus ambiguous.
We have ﬁnally the following result, which is a consequence of the two propositions above:
Proposition 3 For low-educated parents,
(i) the lower the eﬃciency of parents’ eﬀort δ, the lower the time spent with their children
el∗, i.e. ∂el∗
∂δ > 0;
(ii) the lower the eﬃciency of eﬀort δ, the higher the probability to be uneducated and the
lower the probability to be educated, i.e. ∂πll
∂δ < 0 and ∂πlh
∂δ > 0;
(iii) When δ is low enough δ,i . e .δ → 0,t h ee ﬀort el∗ provided by uneducated parents is
negligible and thus the quality of the neighborhood q has no impact on el∗. In that case,
the probability to be educated or not only depends on the quality of the neighborhood,
that is πll =1− q and πlh = q.
This last proposition focuses on low-educated parents. If education is not a priority at
all (δ → 0) or equivalently if the returns of parents’ involvement are very low (because
13for example the parents themselves do not have the capacity to help their children), then
obviously only the environment where children live (i.e. peers and role models) will aﬀect
children’s educational attainment.
To summarize, the key feature of this model is that both socialization inside the family
(the role of parents) and socialization outside the family (the role of peers, schools and
role models) play an important role in the education process of children. If they live in a
“good” environment with educated parents who take care of them, then the chance to reach
a high level of education is quite high. If, on the contrary, they live in a rundown area
with schools of low qualities and negative peer pressures and if on top of that their parents
are not educated and do not spend time with them, then the probability to be educated is
quite low for these children. This is an acute problem since the increase in the number of
one-parent families in the past decade has been dramatic. According to the U.S. Bureau of
the Census, today, over 20 percent of families with children are maintained by a separated,
divorced, widowed, or never-married parent. Among these families, 9 of 10 are maintained
by mothers. One-ﬁfth of children under 18 years of age presently live in a one-parent family,
an increase of well over 50% in the past 10 years.14
4 Empirical strategy and econometric issues
We would like to test propositions 1, 2 and 3, that is the inﬂuence of the local environment
(quality of the peers) on the parents’ decisions in spending time with their children and
the impact of both parents’ investment and local environment quality on the education
attainment of the children.
In our empirical strategy, we adopt a two-stage procedure.
In the ﬁrst stage, we test Proposition 1 (and Proposition 3). The exact empirical coun-
terpart of ei is the share of time spent caring for a child’s education; it is not reported
in our data sets. Thus, we model the underlying parent’s propensity in investing in their
children education as a linear function of parental, child, household and neighborhood char-
acteristics and we use as indicator variable an ordered response variable based on qualitative
information on the parent’s interest in his/her child’s education. A standard ordered probit
14This is even more dramatic for African American families living in inner-city ghettoes since in most cases
the father is absent and does not live with his children (Wilson, 1987). Indeed, the average conﬁguration
of black families has changed from the 1960s, when only 25% of African-American children were living in
single-parent, primarily poor, homes. In the 1990s, 54% of African American children are born into poverty,
and 65% percent are living with a single parent at any given time (Johnson, 1996).
14estimator is employed and from this we predict the dedication to the child’s education of
each parent. From Proposition 1, the following model is considered:
e
i
z,k,t = αqk,t +
M X
m=1
βmxm,t + εz,t z =1 ,...,Z (11)
where ei
z,k,t is the (unobservable) time spent by parent z of type i = h,l who resides in area
k =1 ,...,K at time t for educating his/her child (who is not yet educated); qk,t is the average
q u a l i t yi nt e r m so fe d u c a t i o no fa r e ak at time t; xm,t (for m =1 ,...,M) is a set of M control
variables at the parental, child, household and area level at time t accounting for diﬀerences
in socio-economic characteristics between parents, children, families and areas; εi,t is a white
n o i s ee r r o rt e r m . T h et i m ep e r i o dt has to be the oﬀspring’s childhood or early teenage
since we want him/her not to be yet educated. A successful test of Proposition 1 would be
that, for educated parents (i = h), α is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For non-educated
parents, following Proposition 3, depending of the value of δ (which is unobservable), α
could be signiﬁcant (if δ is high enough) or not signiﬁcant (if δ is low enough). Moreover, in
both cases, the sign of α would indicate either cultural substitution (if negative) or cultural
complementarity (if positive). Model (11) is estimated separately for high-educated and
low-educated parents, considering the pooled sample of mothers and fathers, irrespective to
the fact that they are a couple. Information on each individual’s partner enters only in the
control variables (at the household level).
Next, turning to the second stage, that is the test of Proposition 2 (and Proposition 3), for
each child, we need to have a unique indicator of the parental dedication to her/his education,
distinguishing between parents of diﬀerent types i = h,l.W ed e ﬁne parents of type i = l if
both the mother and the father are low educated, parents of type i = h otherwise (i.e. at least
one of the two is highly educated). From model (11), the estimated propensity in investing
in a child’s education for each couple of parents is then averaged over the couple and used in
the test of Proposition 2. Speciﬁcally, we model the likelihood of a successful or unsuccessful
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θvxv,t + ηn,t+1 n =1 ,...,N (12)
where π
ij
n,t+1 is the probability that an adult n at time t +1(who was a child n at t)w h o s e
parents are of type i = h,l attains the level of education j = h,l; qk,t is the quality of the
neighborhood k when the adult was a child at time t; b ei
k,t is the (average) predicted type-i
15parents’ dedication to a child’s schooling at time t in area k; ηn,t+1 is a white noise error
term. Among the other explanatory variables in the set xv,t (for v =1 ,...,V ), there are some
(but not all) of the variables that entered in the set xm,t from model (11), allowing these
variables to have a diﬀerent impact on π
ij
n,t+1 than they had on ei
z,k,t. Observe that this is of
particular interest for our target variable qk,t, which has been separated out in model (11)
from the set of control variables for ease of clarity. The four probabilities π
ij
t+1 are analyzed
using four diﬀerent probit models, each of them having the dependent variable equal to one
if the (observed) implied child’s educational attainment is achieved and zero otherwise. A
successful test of Proposition 2 would imply that for children of educated parents, both the
eﬀect of qk,t and b ei
k,t have to be signiﬁcant, whereas for children of non-educated parents,
both eﬀects are expected to be signiﬁcant only if δ is high enough, otherwise only the impact
of qk,t should matter. Finally, if there is cultural complementarity, one would expect both
the impacts of qk,t and b ei
k,t to be positive for πhh and πlh and negative for πhl and πll while,
with cultural substitution, their signs would be undetermined.
Provided that b ei
k,t is uncorrelated with ηn,t+1, the two-stage procedure adopted here
produces consistent estimates of the parameters in model (12). Only a correction of the
variance-covariance matrix is needed in order to account for the sampling variation in the
ﬁrst stage parameters (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 116). To assume that parental propen-
sity in investing in a child’s education (estimated from model (11)) is not correlated with
any unobservable factor in model (12) requires that the indicator of parental interest in a
child’s education should not be driven by the child’s schooling performance (otherwise some
unobservable factors aﬀecting individuals’ ultimate educational attainment, very likely also
correlated with their schooling performance, will cause inconsistent estimates of γ). This is
ensured by taking the information on parental interest in a child’s education in the early
childhood, ideally when children have just started school (say 6-7 years old). In other words,
t h et i m el a gb e t w e e nt and t+1should be large enough to ensure that b ei
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5.1 Data set
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS).
It is a longitudinal survey that follows British persons who were born between the 3rd
and 9th of March 1958, with follow-up surveys in 1965 at age 7 (NCDS sweep one), in
161969 at age 11 (NCDS sweep two), in 1974 at age 16 (NCDS sweep three), in 1981 at
age 23 (NCDS sweep four), and in 1991 at age 33 (NCDS sweep ﬁve). This dataset is
ideal for the purpose of this paper as it contains detailed parental and child information, as
well as data on family background, school quality and Census ward identiﬁers for cohort’s
members residential addresses. Good family background information is essential when trying
to ﬁnd evidence of neighborhood eﬀects, since neighborhood characteristics may proxy for
unobservable family characteristics. The information on the residential location available
for 1974 allows us to match NCDS data with the 1971 Census data, obtaining a detailed
picture of the residential neighborhood community when cohort’s members were teenagers
(age 13). Census information is taken from the Small Area Statistics (SAS) 1971 datasets.
In particular, data on education, economic activity and occupation of each area residential
community are only available for the 10% sample survey. This implies extremely small
sample sizes per area if the most basic census spatial unit, i.e. enumeration district (with
an average of 300-400 residents), is used as neighborhood measure. We use ward level data,
providing 17,500 areas in UK in 1971 with an average of 3,000-4,000 residents. A Census
ward contains roughly ten enumeration districts.
Our empirical analysis matches information on individuals’ education attainment at age
33 from the NCDS ﬁfth sweep with the information on parental characteristics, quality of the
school attended at age 16, ability in the childhood from earlier NCDS sweeps and residential
neighborhood information from the 1971 Census (when individuals are 13 years old).
As most longitudinal surveys, attrition and incomplete information is an issue in the
NCDS. In addition, the sample selection requirements for the purpose of this paper are quite
stringent. However, comparing descriptive statistics of the whole sample and our selected
one, it does not appear that we lose representativeness. Considering only individuals that
did not move out of local area since child’s birth (derived from NCDS sweeps one and three)
and without missing values in our target variables, our ﬁnal sample is of 3,477 children and
5,871 parents in 1,689 wards.
5.2 Deﬁnition of variables
The key variables in the theoretical model are parent’s eﬀort in child’s education (ei), the
transition probabilities (πij) and the average neighborhood human capital (q).
Let us ﬁrst discuss our empirical proxy for parent’s interest in child’s education. The
ideal variable to measure parent’s eﬀort would have been the number of hours spent investing
in child’s education (reading to the child, meeting teachers, etc...). Unfortunately, this
variable is not directly available in the NCDS. However, the NCDS provides qualitative
17information on parental interest in child’s education. In particular, the school questionnaire
of diﬀerent NCDS sweeps (1965, 1969, 1974) contains the following question: “With regard
to the child’s educational progress, do the mother/father appear: over concerned about the
child’s progress and/or expecting too high a standard? Very interested? To show some
interest? To show little or no interest? Can’t say or inapplicable”, and it is stated to ring
the appropriate deﬁnition (only one for each parent). We exclude the mothers and fathers
answering “Can’t say or inapplicable” category. The interesting feature of this question
is that it is not answered by the parents themselves but by the children’s teachers and
headmasters. Because in our theoretical model we focus on the impact of the parent’s eﬀort
on his/her child’s education, we use the NCDS sweep one (age 7 in 1965), i.e. when the
child has just started school and has not yet be “educated”. This choice should ensure
that this indicator of parental interest in a child’s education is not driven by the child’s
schooling performance, thus solving possible endogeneity issues in the second stage of our
empirical strategy (see the end of Section 4). Indeed, the parents’ interest in his/her child
education at that early stage as perceived by headmasters (based on parent’s telephone calls
asking information about courses and textbooks, frequency of parental visits to the school,
meetings with teachers, etc...) should closely proxy parental care (in the sense used in the
model, namely the amount of time spent caring for a child’s education) independently from
children future schooling achievements.15
For robustness check, we also report the results obtained by considering an alternative
proxy based on parental self-reported information on the frequency they read to their child,
a l s ot a k e nw h e nt h ec h i l di so fa g e7 .S p e c i ﬁcally, in the NCDS sweep one parental question-
naire it is asked: “Does the mother/father read to, or read with, the child?”, and the possible
answers suggested are “Yes, at least every week; Yes occasionally; Never or hardly never;
Don’t know or inapplicable”. Here also we exclude the mothers and fathers who answer
“Don’t know or inapplicable”.
Let us now turn to the empirical counterparts of the other key variables of the theoretical
model, that is πij and q.T h e N C D S s w e e p ﬁve (the child is now a 33 years old adult in
1991) provides information on the highest qualiﬁcation obtained by the cohort’s members.
We deﬁne high-educated individuals the ones with A-levels or above qualiﬁcations and low-
educated individuals otherwise. The information on the parents’ education is derived from
15The use of other indicators of parental interest from later sweeps (including a continuous variable report-
ing the number of parents/teachers meetings from NCDS third sweep) does not anyway change qualitatively
our results. We also construct a combined variable from diﬀerent indicators obtained using a factor analysis
(reliability assessed by Cronbach’s alpha), but no qualitatively diﬀerent results are obtained.
18the age the parents left school, which is reported in 1974 (NCDS sweep three). Consistently
with the aggregation used for cohort’s member education, we deﬁne high-educated parents
the ones that left school at an age greater than 18 years and low-skilled otherwise. So, for
example, πhh
n,t+1 is the probability that an adult n of 33 years old in t +1=1 9 9 1 ,w h o s ea t
least one of his/her parent has a A-level or above degree, has him(her)self at least a A-level.
Finally, as a proxy for the average neighborhood education quality in an area k at time
t,i . e .qk,t, we use the percentage of persons over 18 years old holding a A-level or more in a
ward k from the Census 1971 data, i.e. when the child is 13 years old.
To summarize, we evaluate parents’ eﬀort when the child is 7 (in 1965), the quality of the
neighborhood and parents’ level of education when the child is 13-16 (in 1971 − 1974) and
the child’s education attainment when he/she is 33 years old (in 1991). Precise deﬁnitions of
these variables and of all the others used in the empirical analysis can be found in Appendix
1.16 T a b l e1c o n t a i n st h es u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c s .
6 Empirical results
Before commenting the estimation results, we discuss Table 2, which gives simple information
on parents’ eﬀort ei∗. It provides some evidence in line with result (i) of Proposition 1.
Indeed, as suggested by Proposition 1 (i), Table 2 shows that more educated parents put
more eﬀort in educating their children than less educated parents. Indeed, depending on the
way parental interest is measured and at which age of the child it is calculated, between 60
and 80 percent of children have educated parents who are highly interested in their education
while it is between 20 and 40 percent for children of less educated parents. For example, if
we consider parents taking the initiative to discuss about their children with the headmaster
or any member of the teaching staﬀ at the child’s age 7, then 75 percent of them are high-
educated while only 25 percent are low-educated parents.
Let us now focus on the estimation results of models (11) and (12). Firstly, we provide
evidence of whether or not the educational composition of a neighborhood aﬀects high-skilled
and low-skilled parents’ involvement in their child’s education (Table 3, tests of Propositions
1 and 3). Secondly, we assess the relative importance of high-skilled (low-skilled) parents’
involvement in the child’s education and average neighborhood human capital on the child’s
ultimate educational attainment (Table 4 and 5, tests of Proposition 2 and 3).
16All data can be obtained from the UK Data Archive. We acknowledge the original data creators and
depositors. They bear no responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.
196.1 Neighborhood quality and parental’s behavior
Table 3 reports estimated marginal eﬀects at the sample means and t-statistics (in paren-
theses) of our proxy for residential community human capital (i.e. percentage of high-skilled
population) based on the ordered probit estimation of model (11). It uses alternative depen-
dent variables and diﬀerent selections of control variables.17 Column (1) displays the results
controlling only for child and neighborhood characteristics. Column (2) adds parental back-
ground information and Column (3) includes also controls for the quality and type of the
school attended by the child.18
Observe that the estimation results are qualitatively the same if one uses as the dependent
variable either the level of parental interest of a child’s education or the frequency a parent
reads to the child. We will thus now focus on the ﬁrst measure. As stated above, we run
diﬀerent regressions for high- and low-educated parents.
For high-educated parents, all regressions show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant ef-
fects of neighborhood quality of parental interest in child’s education. This suggests cultural
complementarity in parents’ behavior since the better the quality of the neighborhood, the
more they invest in their child’s education. However, when moving from Column (1) to
Column (3), that is where more control variables on parental background and school charac-
teristics are included, the magnitude of the marginal eﬀect decreases from 0.34 to 0.10.T h i s
provides some evidence that neighborhood variables may proxy for unobservable family and
school characteristics. Nevertheless, we still ﬁnd that an incremental change in the propor-
tion of high skilled people living nearby leads to a signiﬁcant 0.10 increase in the propensity
of a parent to increase her/his level of interest in her/his child for an average parent.
For low-educated parents, the coeﬃcients are always positive but no signiﬁcant (only at
the 10 percent level in Column (1)). In conformity with Propositions 1 and 3, this may be
due to the fact that δ, the returns to parents’ eﬀort or parents’ priority in terms of education,
is quite small.
The evidence collected so far (Table 2 and 3) seems to indicate that for high-educated
parents the child’s educational attainment may be aﬀected by both the neighborhood quality
and parents’ involvement while, for low-educated parents, only the neighborhood quality may
17We focus on the estimated impact of our target variable across diﬀerent speciﬁcations, between skill
groups and using alternative dependent variables. For ease of brevity, we do not comments the results
related to our control variables, that are anyway in line with the expectations. The complete table with all
the control variables is available upon request. Diﬀerent sets of control variables have also been used, but
the qualitative results remain unchanged.
18Regional dummies as well as a dummy variable indicating if the parent is a female are included in all
speciﬁcations.
20play a role. In the next section, we investigate further these issues by providing a test of
Proposition 2 (stage two of our empirical strategy).
6.2 Neighborhood quality, parental behavior and child’s education
attainment
Let us now focus on the test of the implications of the model with respect of the expected
school achievement of each individual. For high-educated parents, the key feature of the in-
tergenerational education transmission mechanism proposed in Section 3 is that both social-
ization inside the family and socialization outside the family (neighborhood quality) plays
an important role in the education process of children. This implies that the residential
neighborhood directly aﬀects the expected school achievement of children and also indirectly
through its inﬂuence on parental eﬀort in a child’ education. For low-educated parents,
we might expect a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the neighborhood quality on children’s educational
attainment only.
Table 4 and 5 report marginal eﬀects at the sample means and t-statistics (in parentheses)
of our proxy for parental interest in child’s education and residential community human
capital based on the probit estimation of model (12).19 These tables have the same structure
as Table 3, i.e. they contain in the diﬀerent columns the estimates obtained using the
diﬀerent selections of control variables considered in Table 3.20 The tables show four sets of
results, one for each transition probability πij described in Proposition 2.21 Table 4 reports
the estimated eﬀects of parental interest, neighborhood human quality and their interaction
19The results obtained using our alternative proxy of parental care in a child’s education (ﬁrst stage
predictions using the frequency parents read to child) are qualitatively the same, thus not discussed and not
reported here for brevity.
20Note that among the individual-level variables we include both arithmetic and reading test scores when
the child is 7 years old aiming to control for child’s ability (that may be passed genetically by parents, see
Plug and Vijverberg, 2003). Also, among the area-level controls we include the proportion of employed in
agriculture to account for area industry specialization on education choices and total area population to
control for agglomeration eﬀects. Indeed, children that grow up in agricultural areas will be more likely to
leave school to continue in agriculture work, regardless of the parental involvement in their education; and
any intergeneration link may be aﬀected by diﬀerent degrees of individuals’ social networks and physical
proximity, that distinguish urban from rural areas.
21Also in this case, we focus our attention on the estimated impact of our target variables. The complete
set of results for all control variables in the four probit estimations in the diﬀerent models speciﬁcations, and
for the two skills groups are not reported for brevity. They are in line with the expectations, and available
upon request. Also in this case, diﬀerent sets of control variables have been used, but the qualitative results
remain unchanged.
21term whereas Table 5 contains the results after removing the interaction term from the
model speciﬁcation. Comparing Table 4 and Table 5 it can be seen that the impact of the
interaction term (estimate of ρ in model (12)) is never signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation and
that the eﬀects of the other variables are almost unchanged. This indicates that the eﬀect
of parental interest on children’s education attainment does not vary with neighborhood
human quality. Thus, we focus our attention on the results contained in Table 5.
Let us start with high-educated parents and thus focus on πhh and πhl.A l lc o e ﬃcients are
signiﬁcant both for parental interest and neighborhood quality. However, the sign is exactly
the opposite, that is always positive for πhh and negative for πhl. In words, children whose
parents are educated are more likely to be educated if parents spend time educating them
a n di ft h en e i g h b o r h o o dw h e r et h e yl i v ei so fg o o dq u a l i t y .O nt h ec o n t r a r y ,t h el e s sp a r e n t s
are interested in their child’s schooling and the worse the neighborhood quality, the more
likely children, whose parents are educated, will be uneducated. This suggests that, for high-
educated parents, both parents’ involvement and neighborhood quality play a crucial role in
the intergenerational transmission of education. If one compares the coeﬃcients, then one
can see that the magnitude of the eﬀect is higher for parental interest than for neighborhood’s
quality. Indeed, when all the controls are considered (Column (3)), for the quality of the
neighborhood, the increase in the average probability of a successful transmission of the
parental level of education is only of 0.81 percent, and the decrease in the average probability
of an unsuccessful transmission is only 1.75 percent. For parental interest, the ﬁgures are
much higher, that is 13.11 percent and 9.35 percent, respectively. This indicates that the
latter eﬀect is more potent than the former one.
Concerning low-educated parents, i.e. πlh and πll, only the quality of the neighborhood
has a signiﬁcant impact on children’s educational attainment. Going back to the model
a n dh a v i n gi nm i n dT a b l e2 ,o n ec a nc o n j e c t u r et h a tt h i sr e s u l ti sd u et oal o wδ,t h a t
is either low-educated parents spend time with their oﬀspring but are not eﬃcient or do
n o tp r i o r i t i z ee d u c a t i o na n dt h u sa r en o tt h a t interested in the educational attainment of
their children. Concerning the inﬂuence of the neighborhood, we obtain the expected signs,
that is positive for πlh and negative for πll. In words, a better quality neighborhood has
a positive impact on the chance to become educated and a negative impact on the chance
to be uneducated. Observe that, when all the controls are considered (Column (3)), when
the quality of the neighborhood increases marginally, the decrease in the average probability
that a child remains low educated is 2.62 percent and the increase in the average probability
a child will end up being highly educated is 5.16 percent. Thus the eﬀect is larger (roughly
twice as much) for πlh than for πll, which means that the percentage of high-skilled workers
22in a neighborhood plays a major role in determining the chance to become educated for a
child whose parents are not educated.
These results suggest that a failure in transmitting education for high-educated parents
is more related to their lack of interest or time rather than to a negative inﬂuence of the
local environment. On the other hand, children whose parents are low-skilled have some
chance to obtain higher degrees if they live in a good neighborhood. In that case, parental
dedication in education does not seem to play any role either because they are not eﬃcient
or because they do not prioritize education.
6.3 Endogeneity issues and further robustness checks
The assessment of the eﬀects of neighborhood level variables on individual outcomes is
typically characterized by endogeneity issues arising from individuals’ residential location
choices, that render the identiﬁcation and the measurement of these eﬀects problematic.
Observe however the slightly diﬀerent approach of our analysis. Our emphasis is not on the
measurement of the size of the neighborhood eﬀects on individual outcomes but rather in the
search for evidence consistent with the predictions of the model, that is with the existence
of the proposed channel mediating these eﬀects. We look at the mechanism translating
neighborhood characteristics into individual outcomes, once residential location choices are
made. Speciﬁcally, our question is the following. Given the neighborhood parents choose or
can aﬀord to live, how is their behavior (in terms of interest in their oﬀspring education)
aﬀected by the quality of their residential community? Do they leave to the residential
community the main role in educating their children (cultural substitution) or will they
p u tm o r ee ﬀort to educate their children the more educated is their residential community
(cultural complementarity)?
If parents’ concerns about their children education is driving location choices, then high-
income and high-educated parents may choose higher educational status neighborhood on
the basis of the anticipated eﬀects on their child’s education attainment. However, at this
stage, two scenarios may take place. On the one hand, anticipating that their children
will attain a high level of education, parents may not invest much time in their children
education; alternatively, parental eﬀort in a child’s education may be higher the higher is
the education attainment of the local community. The underlying not obvious education
transmission mechanism is the research question addressed in this paper. Thus, the model
treats the distribution of agents by neighborhood as ﬁxed and consequently the empirical
analysis considers the educational attainment of the local community as exogenous variable
with respect to parents’ interest in their child education.
23Nevertheless, in order to exclude the possibility that the endogeneity of moving decisions22
may cause some unobservable heterogeneity that could drive our results, we address this issue
in our empirical analysis. We test for exogeneity of the neighborhood’s human capital level
with respect to parental interest in a child’s education by using a two-step instrumental
variables methodology with a ﬁrst stage linear regression and a second stage ordered probit
estimation (procedure described in Wooldridge, 2002, p. 474). This procedure simply implies
to estimate an augmented version of model (11), that is
e
i
z,k,t = αqk,t +
M X
m=1
βmxm,t + ρb vk + εz,t z =1 ,...,Z
where b vk are the residual of a regression of qk,t on a set of exogenous variables that contains
t h eo n e si nxm,t (for m =1 ,...,M) as a subset. Using the standard probit t-test, a failure to
reject the hypothesis H0 : ρ =0indicates that qk,t can be taken as exogenous variable. In our
case, we obtain a t-test statistic for ρ equal to 1.21, suggesting that the possible endogenous
sorting of parents into neighborhoods should not be a major concern in our analysis. In
other words, we can assume that parents’ residential location decisions are not essentially
driven by their interest in their children future education attainment.
This evidence crucially depends on the chosen sources of exogenous variation when esti-
mating b vk, that is on the chosen instruments for qk,t. We use as instrument for the average
neighborhood education level, the neighborhood population age structure. The motivation
is as follows. The UK labor force is characterized by younger cohorts having a higher level
of education than older ones.23 Thus, the proportion of young persons living in the neigh-
borhood is correlated with the proportion of highly qualiﬁed persons in the neighborhood
but it is not expected to be correlated with any unobserved factor that aﬀects a parent’s
interest in his/her child’s education.
Let us turn our attention to the robustness checks of the test of Proposition 2. In order
to increase the conﬁdence in our empirical results, we estimate model (12) using a diﬀerent
dependent variable. We take individuals’s years of completed schooling as a proxy for indi-
vidual’s education achievement (in logs). The OLS results of model (12) estimated separately
for high-educated and low-educated parents remain in line with the results displayed in Ta-
bles 4 and 5 and thus with the predictions of the theoretical model . Indeed, the estimated
eﬀect of parental interest in a child education is found to be positive and signiﬁcant for
children whose parents are high-skilled whereas it is positive but not signiﬁcant for children
22Note that we select in our sample only families that do not move after the child’s birth, but it is not
possible to control for any previous residential change related to the child’s birth.
23See in particular Oﬃce of National Statistics (2003).
24whose parents are low skilled. The average educational attainment of the local community
is found to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect in both cases. The interaction term has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect. These results remain qualitatively unchanged if the average educational
attainment of the local community is instrumented using the neighborhood population age
structure.
It is worthwhile noting that we do not put much emphasis on the size of the estimated
eﬀects. Clearly our empirical analysis suﬀers from parametric assumptions and the results
may not be conclusive. Once more, the attention in this paper is focussed on the attempt to
propose a microfoundation of neighborhood eﬀects. The scope of our empirical investigation
is to provide some evidence in support of the predictions of the theoretical model.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has proposed a microeconomic mechanism of neighborhood eﬀects on educational
attainment based on parents’ involvement in education. In line with the general consensus
that neighborhoods determine only a small proportion of the variation in individual outcomes
(see e.g. Solon, Page and Duncan, 2000), we ﬁnd that average neighborhood human capital
quality does inﬂuence individual education attainments, but the direct eﬀect is quite limited.
T h ec o n t r i b u t i o no ft h i sp a p e rt ot h ee x i s t i n gl i t e r a t u r ec o n s i s t si nt h eﬁnding of a signiﬁcant
neighborhood eﬀect on high-educated parents’ interest in their children’s education, which in
turn play an important role in determining children’s schooling achievement. An interesting
result in the mechanism proposed here is precisely in the fact that the eﬀects are diﬀerent
according to the level of education of parents. The empirical evidence supports these pre-
dictions. Indeed, children’s educational attainment of high-educated parents appear to be
inﬂuenced by both parents’ involvement and neighborhood quality while, for low-educated
parents, only the neighborhood quality matters.
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27Appendix 1: Description of variables24
Cohort’s members variables
special education: dummy variable taking value one if the child has been ascertained
as in need of special education (speech defect, physically handicapped, partially sighted or
hearing, delicate, etc...). Source: NCDS1
birth order: child’s position in birth order (with respect to brothers and sisters). Source:
NCDS2
arithmetic test score: child’s age-7 arithmetic test scores. Source: NCDS1
reading test score: child’s age-7 reading test scores. Source: NCDS1
schooling: years of completed schooling (derived variable from months of completed
schooling up to 1981 and monthly activity information up to 1991. Source: NCDS4 and
NCDS5
School variables
school quality: proportion of boys or girls studying for GCE and SCE O-levels25 in the
school attended by the child at age 16. Source: NCDS3
school composition: percentage of children with non-manual fathers in the school attended
by the child at age 16 (9 bands, 8 dummies). Source: NCDS3
school type: type of school attended by the child at age 16: private, grammar, secondary
modern, comprehensive, (4 types, 3 dummies). Source: NCDS3
Family background variables26
female: dummy variable taking value one if the parent is female. Source: NCDS1
parental interest: variable taking value of 4 if the parent is over concerned about the
child’s education progress and/or expecting too high a standard, 3 if very interested, 2 if
he/she shows some interest and 1 if she/he shows little or no interest. Source: NCDS1.
parent reads to child: variable taking value of 3 if the parent reads to the child at least
every week, 2 if she/he reads to the child only occasionally and 1 if she/he never or hardly
never reads to the child. Source: NCDS1
24The main NCDS sweep data source is reported. In order to maintain sample sizes, this information is
often complemented with data coming from earlier or later sweeps to replace missing data.
25GCE (General Certiﬁcate of Education) and SCE (Scottish Certiﬁcate of Education) O-levels (Ordinary
levels) were taken at age 16 mainly by pupils in grammar schools and independent schools - nationally the
top 20% of the population by ability.
26A parent is the mother or the father or a person acting as mother or father respectively. Because in
some cases it was not possible to infer precisely (or obtain the relevant information on) who was the mother
or father substitute, we esclude these "parents" from our sample selection.
28parent born in UK: dummy variable taking value one if the parent is born in Great
Britain. Source: NCDS2
parent income: parent’s weekly net wage, 12 bands, mid-points of each range considered.
Source: NCDS3
parent age: parent’s age in 1974. Source: NCDS1
parent education∗: parent’s completed years of schooling (derived from age left full-time
education). Source: NCDS3
high educated parent∗: high educated parent’s completed years of schooling (derived from
age left full-time education greater than 18). Source: NCDS3
low educated parent∗: high educated parent’s completed years of schooling (derived from
age left full-time smaller or equal to 18). Source: NCDS3
parent employed: dummy variable taking value one if the parent is working. Source:
NCDS3
parent social class: social class of parent (or person acting as that parent): professional,
intermediate status, skilled non-manual, skilled manual, semi-skilled manual, semi-skilled
non-manual, unskilled (7 classes, 6 dummies). Source: NCDS2
parent health problems: dummy variable taking value one if the parent suﬀered from
chronic or serious disability or ill-health, including any hospital in patient admission of 2
weeks or longer. Source: NCDS2
single parent: dummy variable taking value one if there is no regular father ﬁgure or
there is no natural mother. Source: NCDS2
household ﬁnancial problems: dummy variable taking value one if the family experienced
ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Source: NCDS2
h o u s e h o l dh e a l t hp r o b l e m s : dummy variable taking value one if the family experienced
health-related diﬃculties (serious ill-health of a member of the household, including death
of mother or father). Source: NCDS2
council house: dummy variable taking value one if the family lived in council provided
accommodation.27 Source: NCDS3
house size: number of rooms in household accommodation. Source: NCDS3
family size: number of people in household. Source: NCDS3
∗Clearly these variables are not included in the regressions. Parent education is used to deﬁne high-skilled and low-skilled
parents. We report summary statistics for high educated parent and low educated parent only to provide further information
about our sample selection.
27These programs are equivalent to the housing projects in the US.
29Residential neighborhood variables (Census Ward level variables or otherwise spec-
iﬁed)
high skilled population: proportion of over-18s persons with A-levels (highest grade at
age 16 exams) or above qualiﬁcations. Source: Census 1971
young population: proportion of persons aged less than 21. Source: Census 1971
total population: total population present. Source: Census 1971
unemployment rate: unemployed over economically active population. Source: Census
1971
activity rate: economically active population (aged more than 15) over present popula-
tion. Source: Census 1971
activity rate (males): economically active males (aged more than 15) over present popu-
lation aged more than 15. Source: Census 1971
activity rate (females): economically active females (aged more than 15) over present
population aged more than 15. Source: Census 1971
women working hours rate: proportion of women aged less than 45 working weekly less
than 8 hours. Source: Census 1971
agriculture employment: proportion of workers in agriculture employment. Source: Cen-
sus 1971 (Local Authority)
mining and manufacturing employment: proportion of workers in mining and manufac-
turing employment. Source: Census 1971 (Local Authority)
professional employment: professional and managerial employees over active population.
Source: Census 1971 (Local Authority)
unskilled manual employment: unskilled manual employees over active population. Source:
Census 1971 (Local Authority)
amenities: proportion of households lacking or sharing hot water and/or inside toilet
and/or bath. Source: Census 1971
rooms per household: total rooms over total households. Source: Census 1971
persons per room: proportion of households having 1.5 or more persons per room. Source:
Census 1971
lone parent families: proportion of families with children head by a single parent. Source:
Census 1971
council housing: proportion of households residing in council houses. Source: Census
1971
car access: proportion of households with no car. Source: Census 1971
distance to jobs: proportion of workers travelling to jobs by train. Source: Census 1971
30Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
special education 3477 0.24 0.43 0 1
birth order 3477 1.42 1.85 1 10
arithmetic test score 3477 5.12 2.49 0 10
reading test score 3477 23.39 7.11 0 30
schooling 3477 12.54 2.002 9.55 20.56
school quality 3477 0.24 0.32 0 1
school composition 3477 4.68 2.41 1 9
school type 3477 3.01 1.29 1 4
parent interest 5981 1.77 0.12 1 4
parent read to child 5981 1.34 0.16 1 3
parent education 5981 14.24 2.37 6 25
high educated parent 3244 19.04 2.68 18 25
low educated parent 2747 9.01 2.41 6 18
parent wage 5981 24,001 11,112 2 69
parent age 5981 43.47 8.98 32 78
parent social class 5981 3.92 1.55 1 7
parent employed 5981 0.79 0.38 0 1
parent born in UK 5981 0.69 0.46 0 1
female 5981 0.51 0.50 6 25
household income 5981 43,624 21.321 4 167
single mother 5981 0.003 0.055 0 1
parent health problems 5981 0.05 0.22 0 1
household health problems 5981 0.09 0.16 0 1
household ﬁnancial problems 5981 0.08 0.24 0 1
council house 5981 0.18 0.49 0 1
house size 5981 4.93 1.45 1 35
family size 5981 4.88 1.64 0 17
31high skilled population 1689 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.69
young population 1689 0.31 0.10 0.09 0.41
total population (thousands) 1689 59.79 73.29 7.08 267.44
unemployment rate 1689 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.18
activity rate 1689 0.61 0.04 0.30 0.72
activity rate (males) 1689 0.82 0.04 0.55 0.91
activity rate (females) 1689 0.43 0.06 0.23 0.59
women working hours rate 1689 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.25
professional employment 1689 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.56
unskilled manual employment 1689 0.06 0.04 0.007 0.17
agriculture employment 1689 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.64
mining and manufacturing employment 1689 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.75
lone parent families 1689 0.04 0.01 0.004 0.09
amenities 1689 0.17 0.098 0.00 0.46
persons per room 1689 0.02 0.02 0.001 0.15
rooms per household 1689 4.10 0.58 2.05 7.86
council housing 1689 0.29 0.35 0 0.79
distance to jobs 1689 0.39 0.25 0 0.70
car access 1689 0.25 0.46 0.09 0.76
32Table 2: Parental interest by education groups
Variable∗ high educated parents low educated parents
1) parental interest age 7 63% 37%
2) parental interest age 11 66% 34%
3) parents read to child age 7 59% 41%
4) parental initiative to discuss child age 7 75% 25%
5) parental initiative to discuss child age 11 71% 29%
6) parents/teachers discussions age 16 81% 19%
7) parental anxiety education age 16 69% 31%
∗We report the precise sweep, interview and question from the NCDS and how we use this
information.
1)-2) NCDS1 school interview: “With regard to the child’s educational progress, do the mother/father appear: over
concerned about the child’s progress and/or expecting too high a standard? Very interested ? To show some interest? To show
little or no interest ? Can’t say or inapplicable.” We consider the percentage of children having each parent over concerned or
very interested.
3) NCDS3 parental interview. “Does the mother/father read to, or read with, the child?” “Yes, at least every week; Yes
occasionally; Never or hardly never; Don’t know or inapplicable.” We consider the percentage of children having both parents
reading at least every week.
4) NCDS1 school interview: “Since September, 1964, have the parents taken the initiative to discuss the child, even brieﬂy,
with you (headmaster) or any member of your teaching staﬀ?” We consider the percentage of children having “yes” to this
question.
5) NCDS2 school questionnaire: “Since the beginning of the school year, has either parent taken initiative to discuss the
c h i l de v e nb r i e ﬂy with you (headmaster) or any member of your teaching staﬀ?” We consider the percentage of children having
the father and/or the mother that took such initiative.
6) NCDS3 parental interview: “Ask the parent how many times during the past twelve months he/she has discussed the
study child’s school progress with his/her teachers. If no such discussion write 0 in box. If 9 or more, please write 9.” The
variable, ranging from 0 to 9, has a mean of 1.39 and a standard deviation of 1.59. We consider the percentage of children
having the parents answering more than 3 to this question.
7) NCDS3 individual interview: “How anxious do you think your parents are that you should do well at school?” “Very
anxious, Fairly anxious, Content if I do my best, They don’t mind one way or another, Uncertain.” We consider the percentage
of children having each parent very anxious or fairly anxious.
33Table 3: Model (11) ordered probit estimates
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)
dependent variable: parental interest
high educated parents
high skilled population 0.3451∗∗∗ (3.03) 0.1429∗∗∗ (3.12) 0.1021∗∗∗ (2.92)
low educated parents
high skilled population 0.2301∗ (1.75) 0.1202 (1.12) 0.0829 (0.92)
dependent variable: parent reads to child
high educated parents
high skilled population 0.2813∗∗∗ (2.65) 0.1333∗∗ (2.53) 0.1075∗∗ (2.36)
low educated parents
high skilled population 0.1282 (0.99) 0.0986 (0.97) 0.0151 (0.46)
Control set:
child variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
neighborhood variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
family background variables no no yes yes yes yes
schooling variables no no no no yes yes
regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
female dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes:
- precise deﬁnitions of control variables by groups in Appendix 1
- marginal eﬀects at the sample means and t-statistics (in parentheses) based
on Huber-White robust standard errors are reported
- coeﬃcients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks
are signiﬁcant at 10 (5) [1] percent level
- n. of obs. 5,981, pseudo R2 in the range 0.2122 - 0.2511
34Table 4: Model (12) probit estimates
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)
πhh
(predicted) parental interest 0.2012∗∗∗ (3.86) 0.1487∗∗∗ (4.01) 0.1301∗∗∗ (3.49)
high skilled population 0.0666∗∗ (2.14) 0.0944∗∗ (2.10) 0.0080∗∗ (2.05)
high skilled population times
parental interest
0.1022 (0.80) 0.0884 (0.76) 0.0027 (0.77)
πll
(predicted) parental interest −0.0800 (0.96) −0.0699 (0.93) −0.0199 (0.91)
high skilled population −0.0776∗∗∗ (2.89) −0.0443∗∗ (2.23) −0.0231∗∗ (2.44)
high skilled population times
parental interest
−0.0452 (1.02) −0.0234 (0.94) −0.0211 (0.52)
πhl
(predicted) parental interest −0.1801∗∗∗ (2.99) −0.1403∗∗ (2.19) −0.0889∗∗ (2.05)
high skilled population −0.1002∗∗ (2.12) −0.0778∗∗ (2.06) −0.0101∗∗ (2.03)
high skilled population times
parental interest
−0.0542 (0.92) −0.0204 (0.70) −0.0098 (0.61)
πlh
(predicted) parental interest 0.0009 (1.01) 0.0019 (0.80) 0.0007 (0.75)
high skilled population 0.0989∗∗ (2.10) 0.0801∗∗ (2.06) 0.0500∗∗ (2.05)
high skilled population times
parental interest
0.0612 (0.87) 0.0422 (0.78) 0.0111 (0.59)
Control set:
child variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
neighborhood variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
family background variables no no yes yes yes yes
schooling variables no no no no yes yes
regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
female dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: - precise deﬁnitions of control variables by groups in Appendix 1
- marginal eﬀects at the sample means and t-statistics (in parentheses) based
on Huber-White robust standard errors are reported
- coeﬃcients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks are signiﬁcant at 10 (5) [1] percent level
- n. of obs. 3,477, pseudo R2 in the range 0.3799 - 0.4314
35Table 5: Model (12) probit estimates
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)
πhh
(predicted) parental interest 0.2191∗∗∗ (4.04) 0.1601∗∗∗ (4.12) 0.1311∗∗∗ (3.88)
high skilled population 0.0891∗∗ (2.39) 0.0108∗∗ (2.13) 0.0081∗∗ (2.10)
πll
(predicted) parental interest −0.0811 (1.02) −0.0721 (1.12) −0.0209 (0.96)
high skilled population −0.0791∗∗∗ (2.92) −0.0481∗∗ (2.44) −0.0262∗∗ (2.52)
πhl
(predicted) parental interest −0.1863∗∗∗ (3.02) −0.1496∗∗ (2.22) −0.0935∗∗ (2.12)
high skilled population −0.1019 (2.15) −0.0802 (2.03) −0.0175 (2.26)
πlh
(predicted) parental interest 0.0012 (1.15) 0.0021 (0.88) 0.0011 (0.76)
high skilled population 0.1081∗∗ (2.25) 0.0826∗∗ (2.17) 0.0516∗∗ (2.15)
Control set:
child variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
neighborhood variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
family background variables no no yes yes yes yes
schooling variables no no no no yes yes
regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
female dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes:
- precise deﬁnitions of control variables by groups in Appendix 1
-m a r g i n a le ﬀects at the sample means and t-statistics (in parentheses) based
on Huber-White robust standard errors are reported
- coeﬃcients marked with one (two) [three] asterisks
are signiﬁcant at 10 (5) [1] percent level
- n. of obs. 3,477, pseudo R2 in the range 0.3754 - 0.4123
36